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has since led to the conclusion of other treaties of a similar character for the improvement of international relations over the whole earth. "It is," says Dunant himself in reference thereto, "a great step in social progress that diplomacy to-day is inclined to give its earnest attention to works of benevolence and social improvement and that princes, the rulers of states, coöperate in bringing about the beneficent results of important movements whose only motive is charity, true and pure humanity, the progress of hospitality and the general welfare of peoples. The human race is destined yet to form only a single great family, in common accord for the general good, and in active mutual coöperation, led by the different princes and governments, for the benefit of the various peoples."

And if you ask me about the further history of the man, who by his own force accomplished so much, the answer unfortunately is that he fared as so many other benefactors of the race have fared. In behalf of the work, the realization of which he had set as his life task, he neglected his own interests, and after he had run through with the large fortune which he inherited, partly through the great sacrifices which he made for the accomplishment of his noble purposes, partly through inexperience in business affairs and misplaced confidence, he was soon entirely forgotten, though he had after his first successes been the recipient of honors and distinctions of all kinds, while his work in the meantime overran the world and spread blessing everywhere. Without permanent home and often struggling for the necessities of life, he lived first in England, then in Germany, where toward the end of the seventies known by few he spent some years in the family of the already well known priest Dr. Wagner then residing in Stuttgart. Subsequently he lived in out-of-the-way places in his native Switzerland. For a series of years he has dwelt in retreat near Rorschach in Switzerland, in a very simple way but in a philosophic disposition, and as in his youth so in his extreme old age inspired with love for everything great and noble. And now, though somewhat late, the man who is so highly deserving is again being remembered, be it said to the honor of our time, and an effort is being made to right the wrong which has been done him. While Dunant was as good as forgotten some years ago, his services are now being recalled again with honor in all sorts of daily papers, periodicals and pamphlets. Especially in his native land, Switzerland, where he is living in retirement, people vie with one another in giving him, on all possible occasions, deserved recognition. Nevertheless the shameful fact remains that for twenty-nine years one of the noblest and most deserving men of our century, who, but for a meagre pension of 1200 francs allowed him by his own family, would long ago have died of hunger, has been allowed to starve and in a hospital to reflect on the thankfulness of his fellowmen!

As the services of victorious generals and successful statesmen are recognized by donations, so this fighter against the horrors of war ought to have received a gift of honor from all the civilized states. But no one thought even of returning to him the large sums (some 50,000 francs) which he had spent in publications and journeys in furtherance of his humanitarian work. With satisfaction, therefore, will the friends of Dunant have learned in recent weeks from the papers that the Empress of Russia has signed a document in which the St. Peters-

burg Committee of the Red Cross pledges an annual pension to the founder*,—but at the same time also with a feeling of shame that Germany, which first of all lands, in the wars of 1866 and 1870, reaped the fruits of Dunant's labors, has allowed herself to be outstripped by another land in paying this debt of honor. But if we are not mistaken, Germany will seek to make amends for her neglect and will follow the noble example of Russia. May the memorial festival which takes place on the 8th of May (1896), Dunant's birthday, at the instigation of the Empress Augusta Victoria, in the White Hall of the Palace at Berlin, and to which all Red Cross Societies have sent their representatives, be a turning point in the fate of the sorely tried man, that to the creator of the Red Cross "may come a happy and peaceful evening, and the Red Cross on the White Flag shed a gentle radiance on his hoary form."

* Unfortunately this statement which was published by several papers has proved on closer investigation to be untrue. But in Stuttgart a provisional committee has been formed, which proposes to make an appeal to the public, and, in order to relieve the condition of the founder of the Red Cross, to ask the ladies and gentlemen of Germany to create a Dunant fund.

ETERNAL PEACE.

BY IMMANUEL KANT

1795.

"TO ETERNAL PEACE."

Whether the above satirical inscription, once put by a certain Dutch innkeeper on his signboard on which a graveyard was painted, holds of men in general, or particularly of the heads of states who are never sated with war, or perhaps only of those philosophers who are always dreaming their sweet dream of peace, need not be here discussed. The author of the present essay claims for himself, however, in presenting his ideas, the protection of one fact. The practical statesman when he comes in contact with the theoretical statesman assumes a haughty air, and looks down upon him with great self-satisfaction as a mere theorizer whose empty ideas can bring no danger to the state, founded, as it must be, on the principles derived from experience; the worldly-wise statesman may therefore, without giving himself any concern, allow the theorizer to throw his eleven skittle-balls all at once. This practical statesman must therefore, in case of a contest with the theoretical statesman, so far proceed consistently as not to suspect that any danger to the state lurks behind the opinions which the latter ventures honestly and openly to express. The author of this essay feels assured that through this "saving clause" he will be in the best manner possible protected against all malicious interpretation.

FIRST SECTION.

Which contains the preliminary articles of a perpetual peace between states.

1. *No conclusion of peace shall be held to be such, which is made with the secret reservation of the material for a future war.*

For, in that event, it would be a mere truce, a postponement of hostilities, not a *peace*. Peace means the end of all hostilities, and to attach to it the adjective "eternal" is a pleonasm which at once arouses suspicion. The causes of a future war, which are present though

perhaps not at the time known even to the powers which are making peace with each other, are entirely removed through a treaty of peace, even those which a keen and dexterous search might discover in documents laid away in the public archives. The mental reservation of old claims, to be brought forward in the future, of which neither party dares at the time to make mention, because both are too much exhausted to continue the war, with the base intention of taking advantage of the first favorable opportunity to assert them, is genuine Jesuitic casuistry. Such a procedure, when looked at in its true character, must be considered beneath the dignity of rulers, and so must the disposition to pursue such deductions be held unworthy of a minister of state. But if, in accordance with certain "enlightened" notions of political wisdom, the true honor of the state is held to consist in the continual increase of power by any and every means, of course the judgment just given will be looked upon as visionary and pedantic.

2. *No state having an independent existence, whether it be small or great, may be acquired by another state, through inheritance, exchange, purchase or gift.*

A state is not a possession or patrimony, like the soil on which it has its seat. It is a society of men, subject to the authority and disposition of none but itself. Since, like a stem, it has its own roots, to incorporate it as a graft into another state is to take away its existence as a moral person and to make of it a thing. This contradicts the idea of the original compact, without which no authority over a people can even be conceived.* Everybody knows into what danger, even in the most recent times, the supposed right of thus acquiring states has brought Europe. Other parts of the world have known nothing of it. But in Europe it has been held that states can marry each other. This has been looked upon in part as a new kind of industry, a way of making oneself powerful through family connections without putting forth personal effort, in part also as a way of extending one's landed possessions. In the same category must be reckoned also the letting out of troops of one state to another, against an enemy not common to the two. Thus the subjects of the state are used and abused as things to be handled at will.

3. *Standing armies shall after a time be entirely abolished.*

For they incessantly threaten other states with war, through their appearing always to be in armed readiness for it. States are thus provoked to outdo one another in number of armed men without limit. Through the expense thus occasioned peace finally becomes more burdensome than a brief war. These armies are thus the cause of wars of aggression, undertaken in order that this burden may be thrown off. In addition to this, the hiring out of men to kill and be killed, an employment of them as mere machines and tools in the hands of another (the state), cannot be reconciled with the rights of humanity as we feel them in our own person. The case is entirely different where the citizens of a state voluntarily drill themselves at stated times in the practice of arms with a view of defending themselves and their fatherland against at-

tacks from without. It would be exactly the same with the accumulation of a war fund. Looked upon by other states as a threat of war, it would lead to their anticipating such a war by making an attack themselves. Because, of the three powers, the power of the army, the power of alliance, and the power of money, the last might well be considered the most reliable instrument of war. The difficulty of ascertaining the amount of the fund accumulated might, however, possibly work a counter effect.

4. *No national debts shall be contracted in connection with the foreign affairs of the state.*

The obtaining of money, either from without or from within the state, for purposes of internal improvement—the improvement of highways, the planting of new colonies, the storing of supplies for years of crop failure, etc.—need create no suspicion. Foreign debts may be contracted for this purpose. But, as an instrument of opposition between the powers, a credit system of debts endlessly growing though always safe against immediate demand (the demand for payment not being made by all the creditors at the same time),—such a system, the ingenious invention of a trading people in this century,—is a dangerous money power. It is a resource for carrying on war which surpasses the resources of all other states taken together. It can only be exhausted through a possible deficit of the taxes, which may be long kept off through the revival of commerce brought about by the reflex influence of the loans on industry and trade. The faculty thus afforded of making war, coupled with the seemingly innate inclination thereto of those possessing power, is a great obstacle in the way of perpetual peace. This obstacle must be made impossible by a preliminary article,—all the more because the finally unavoidable bankruptcy of the state must involve many other states innocently in the disaster, thus inflicting upon them a public injury. Consequently, other states are at least justified in entering into an alliance against such a state and its pretensions.

5. *No state shall interfere by force in the constitution and government of another state.*

For what could justify it in taking such action? Could, forsooth, some offence which that state gives to the subjects of another state? Such a state ought rather to serve as a warning, because of the example of the evils which a state brings upon itself by its lawlessness. In general, the bad example given by one free person to another (as a *scandalum acceptum*) is no lesion of his rights. But the case would be different if a state because of internal dissension should be divided into two parts, each of which, while claiming to constitute a special state, should lay claim to the whole. An outside state, if it should render assistance to one of these, could not be charged with interfering in the constitution of another state, as that state would then be in a condition of anarchy. But as long as this inner strife was not decided, the interference of outside powers would be a trespass on the rights of an independent people struggling only with its own inner weakness. This interference would be an actual offence which would so far tend to render the autonomy of all states insecure.

6. *No state at war with another shall permit such kinds of hostility as will make mutual confidence impossible in time of future peace; such as the employment of assassins, of poisoners, the violation of capitulation, the instigation of treason, in the state against which it is making war.*

* A hereditary kingdom is not a state which may be inherited by another state, but one whose governing power may be transferred by inheritance to another physical person. The state thus acquires a ruler, not the ruler as such (that is, as already possessing another realm) the state.

These are dishonorable stratagems. Some sort of confidence in an enemy's mental honesty must remain even in time of war, for otherwise no peace could be concluded, and the conflict would become a war of extermination. For war is only the dire necessity of asserting one's right by force in a primitive state of society where there is no court at hand to decide in accordance with right. In this state neither party can be declared an unjust enemy, for this presupposes a judicial decision. The *issue* of the conflict, as in the case of a so-called "judgment of God," decides on whose side the right is. But between states no war of punishment can be conceived, because between them there is no relation of superior and subordinate. Whence it follows that a war of extermination, in which destruction may come to both parties at the same time, and to all right also, would result in perpetual peace only when the whole human race was dead and buried. Such a war, therefore, as well as the use of the means which might bring it about, is wholly unallowable. But that the means mentioned above inevitably lead to such a result is clear from the fact that such hellish arts, which are in themselves degrading, when once brought into use, do not continue long within the limits of war. The employment of spies, for example, in which only the dishonorableness of others (which cannot be exterminated all at once) is employed, goes over and is continued in time of peace, and thus the purpose of the peace is quite frustrated.

Although the laws above laid down would be objectively, that is, in the intention of the powers, only prohibitive laws, yet some of them are strict laws, which are valid without distinction of circumstances, and they would tend immediately to produce their prohibitive effects. Such are numbers 1, 5, and 6. Others, as numbers 2, 3, and 4, though not to be considered as exceptions to the principles of right, yet in respect to the application of these principles are subjective, because circumstances often make the time of application indefinite. They admit of delay in fulfilment, without losing sight of their purpose. The purpose, however, does not admit of everlasting delay—"to the Greek Calends," as Augustus was wont to say. The restoration, for example, to certain states of the freedom of which they have been deprived, contrary to our 2d article, must not be indefinitely put off. The delay has in view, not non-restoration, but that there may not be undue haste with its consequent mischief. For the prohibition laid down by the article affects only the mode of acquisition, which is not to be allowed to continue, not the actual state of possession, which, though not conferring a really just title, yet at the time of the supposed acquisition was held by all states to be legitimate according to the current public opinion.

SECOND SECTION

Which contains the definitive articles for a perpetual peace between states.

The state of peace between men who live near one another is not a state of nature. The natural state is rather one of war. In this state, if there are not always actual hostilities, they at least continually threaten. The state of peace must therefore be created, for it is not necessarily secured by the mere absence of hostilities. Even if hostile acts are not committed by one neighbor against another (a state which only the existence of law can bring about), the one can always treat the other as an enemy when he pleases to challenge him to hostilities.

1. *The first definitive article for the securing of perpet-*

ual peace.—The Civil Constitution in every state shall be republican.

In the first place, a constitution founded in accordance with the principles of freedom of a society of men is necessarily republican. In the second place, this is true of one constructed according to the fundamental idea of the dependence of all as subjects upon a common legislation. It is true, thirdly, of one formed according to the principle of the equality of the citizens of the state. The republican constitution is the only one springing out of the idea of the original compact, on which all legitimate legislation of a people must be based. As far as right is concerned, the republican principle in fact lies originally at the basis of all forms of the civil constitution. The only question, therefore, is whether it is the only one which will lead to perpetual peace.

In reality, then, the republican constitution, in addition to the fact that it springs out of the pure concept of right, gives promise of realizing the desired end, namely perpetual peace. The reason of this may be stated as follows:

Where the consent of the citizens of the state is required to determine whether there shall be war or not, as must necessarily be the case where the republican constitution is in force, nothing is more natural than that they should hesitate much before entering on so perilous a game. If they do so, they must take upon themselves all the burdens of war, that is, the fighting, the defraying of the expenses of the war out of their own possessions the reparation of the destruction which it causes, and, greatest of all, the burden of the debts incurred, an endless burden because of the continual prospect of new wars and one which therefore embitters peace itself. On the contrary, in a state where the government is not republican and the subject not a voting citizen, war is the easiest thing in the world to enter upon, because the ruler is not a fellow citizen of the state but its owner. War does not therefore interfere the least with his table enjoyments, his hunting, his pleasure castles, his court feasts, and the like. He decides lightly to enter upon it, as if it were a sort of pleasure party, and as to its propriety he without concern leaves the justification of it to the diplomatic corps who are always ready to find him excuses.

That the republican constitution be not confounded with the democratic, as is generally done, the following must be noticed. The forms of the state (*civitas*) may be divided either according to the difference of the persons holding the governing power or according to the mode of government of the people through their ruler, whoever he may be. The first is properly called the form of the *sovereignty* (*forma imperii*). Only three forms of this kind are possible, according as either *one* only, or *some* allied together, or *all* who make up the body of citizens, possess the governing power. Here we have autocracy, aristocracy and democracy. The second is the form of the *government* (*forma regiminis*) and has regard to the mode in which the state makes use of its supreme power, the mode of course being conformable to the constitution as an act of the general will whereby the mass of individuals becomes a people. Under this aspect the government is either republican or despotic. Republicanism is that form of government in which the executive power is separated from the legislative. Despotism is the irresponsible administration of the state by laws which the ruler himself has enacted. Here the public will is regarded by the ruler as his own private will.

Of the three forms of the state that of democracy, in the proper sense of the word, is necessarily a despotism, because it establishes an executive power in which All decide about and, possibly also, against One, who may not be in accord with it. Hence the All are not really all. This is a contradiction of the general will with itself and with liberty.

Every form of government which is not representative is, properly speaking, not a form of government at all, because one and the same person can no more be lawgiver and at the same time executive administrator of the lawgiver's will than the major premise of a syllogism can be at the same time the conclusion under the minor. Although the other two forms of state constitution are so far erroneous that they give room for such a form of government, yet with them it is at least possible to have a form of government in harmony with the spirit of a representative system. Frederick the Second, for example, was accustomed to say that "he was simply the highest servant of the state." On the contrary, the democratic constitution makes it impossible to have a representative government, because everybody wishes to be lord. We may say, therefore, that the smaller the number of the personal administrators of the state, and the greater the constituency represented by them, the more possible it is to have republicanism under the constitution, at least finally, through a process of gradual reform. For this reason it is more difficult in an aristocracy than in a monarchy to reach this only perfect form of constitution according to the principles of right. In a democracy it is impossible to do so except by means of a violent revolution. The mode of government is however of incomparably more importance to the people than the form of the state, though upon the constitution also very much depends the state's capacity of reaching the end of its existence. But the mode of government, if it is to conform to the idea of right, must necessarily be in accordance with the representative system. In this system alone is a republican form of government possible. Without it, whatever be the nature of the constitution, the form of government is despotic and violent. None of the ancient so called republics had this system. Hence they could not help ending in despotism, of the different kinds of which that is the most enduring in which the supreme power is lodged in a single individual.

2. *Second definitive article for the establishment of perpetual peace. — International right shall be founded on a federation of free states.*

Peoples considered as states may be regarded as individual men. In their natural state, that is, without the restraints of outward laws, they are liable to do one another injury because of their proximity one to another. Every one of them, therefore, for the sake of its own safety can and ought to demand of the others to enter with it into a constitution, like that of the citizens of a state, in which each of them can be secured in his right. This would be a *federation* of peoples, but not necessarily an international state. For this would involve a contradiction; because each state contains the relation of a superior, or lawgiver, to an inferior or subject, while a number of peoples brought together in a single state would form but a single people. This would contradict the principle laid down, since we are here considering the rights of peoples in reference to one another, in so far as they are to be regarded as so many different state and not as fused into one.

We now look with deep disdain on the attachment of savages to their lawless freedom, their preference to be engaged in incessant strife rather than submit themselves to a self-imposed restraint of law, their preference of wild freedom to rational freedom. All this we regard as savagery, coarseness, and beastly degradation of human nature. One would think that civilized peoples, each constituted into a state, would eagerly hasten to get out of a similar detestable condition in their relations to one another, as speedily as possible. Instead of this, however, every state considers its majesty (majesty of a *people* would be an absurd term) to consist in submitting itself to no external compulsion of law whatever, and the glory of the ruler is held to consist in his being free from danger himself and having at his command thousands ready to sacrifice themselves for him in a cause in which they have not the slightest interest. The difference between the European savages and the American consists chiefly in the fact that while many tribes of the latter are entirely eaten up by their enemies, the former know how to make a better use of their captives than to roast and eat them. They use them to increase the number of their subjects and thereby the number of instruments for still more extensive wars.

The baseness of human nature is openly exhibited in the unrestrained relations of peoples to one another, whereas it is much concealed, through the restraint of government, in the civil life of each people, where law is in force. It is matter of wonder therefore that the word "right" has not yet been wholly excluded from the policy of war as pedantic, and that no state has yet been bold enough openly to declare itself in favor of such exclusion. For Hugo Grotius, Puffendorf, Vattel and others — all miserable comforters, unfortunately — although their philosophically or diplomatically conceived codes have not, and can not have, the least legal force, because states as such are not under any common outward restraint, are nevertheless always sincerely quoted to justify any outbreak of war. No example, however, is to be found on the other hand where a state has been induced by arguments supported by the theories of these influential men to desist from any warlike undertaking. This attachment shown by every state, at least professedly, to the idea of right shows that there is to be found in man, though at the time dormant, a moral principle of superior force which leads him to strive for the mastery over the evil principle which is undeniably in him, and to expect such a mastery from others. For otherwise states which wish to go to war with one another would never utter the word "right," not even to make a jest of it, like the Gallic Prince who said: "It is the prerogative which nature has given to the strong over the weak, that the latter should obey him."

The method by which states prosecute their rights can not under present conditions be a process of law, since no court exists having jurisdiction over them, but only war. But through war, even if it result in victory, the question of right is not decided. The treaty of peace puts an end to the present war, not to the condition out of which a new pretext for war may arise. Nor can this pretext be declared out and out unjust, since in this condition every state is judge in its own cause. It is not true of states, according to the law of nations, as of men in a lawless state, according to the law of nature, that they "ought to get out of this state," because as states they

already have an internal constitution founded on right and thus have outgrown the coercive right of others to bring them under a wider legal constitution, in accordance with their conceptions of right. Yet reason, from its supreme throne of moral, lawgiving power, condemns war absolutely as a means of establishing right, and on the other hand makes the state of peace an immediate duty. This state, however, cannot be secured without a compact of the nations with each other. There must therefore be a compact of a peculiar kind, which may be called a *pacific federation* (*foedus pacificum*), which differs from a *treaty of peace* (*pactum pacis*) in that the latter aims to put an end to one war simply, while the former seeks to abolish all wars forever. This federation would not be invested with a single power of a constituted state, but would secure simply the preservation and security of the freedom of a particular state and of others federated with it, without any of them having to submit themselves to public laws and to compulsion under them, as men do in a state of nature. The practicability, or capability of objective realization, of this idea of federation, which ought gradually to be extended to all states and in this way lead to perpetual peace, is capable of being demonstrated. For if it should happen that a powerful and enlightened people should form itself into a republic, a form of government naturally tending to perpetual peace, this would furnish a nucleus of federative union for other states to connect themselves with. Thus the states would secure the conditions of freedom according to the idea of international right, and this federation through the adhesion of other peoples might be extended more and more.

It is easy to understand that a people should say to itself, "We will have no war among ourselves; for we will form ourselves into a state, that is, set ourselves up as a supreme lawgiving, governing and directing authority which shall peacefully dispose of our strifes." But if this state should say, "There shall be no war between me and other states, although I recognize no supreme legislative authority which secures to me my right and to which I secure its right," it is impossible to understand on what ground confidence in the securing of right would be based, except it be something similar to the union of men in civil society, that is, a voluntary federation, which reason necessarily associates with the concept of the right of nations. Otherwise nothing more can be said of the subject at all.

The right to go to war is inconceivable as an element in the concept of international right, for that would be a right based, not on universally valid external laws which limit the freedom of every individual, but on the one-sided principle of determining by force what is right. By the right of war, then, we must mean that men who are so minded do perfectly right when they destroy one another and thus find perpetual peace only in the wide tomb which conceals all the horrible deeds of violence along with their perpetrators. For states in their relations to one another there can be, according to reason, no other way out of the lawless condition which inevitably results in war than that they give up their lawless freedom, just as individual men do, accommodate themselves to public constraining laws and so form an international state (*civitas gentium*) which will grow and at last embrace all the peoples of the earth. But inasmuch as the nations according to their ideas of international

right do not wish this, and consequently reject in practice what is right in principle, if all is not to be lost, there can be, in place of the positive idea of a world-republic only the negative substitute of a permanent, and ever growing federation, as a preventive of war. Such a federation would hold in check the lawless and hostile passions of men, which however would always be liable to burst forth anew. As Virgil says:

"Furor
Impius intus fremit horridus ore cruento."

3. *Third definitive article for the establishment of perpetual peace.*—*The rights of men as citizens of the world shall be restricted to conditions of universal hospitality.*

Here, as in the former articles, the question is not one of philanthropy but of right. Hospitality here signifies the right of a foreigner, in consequence of his arrival on the soil of another, not to be treated by him as an enemy. He may be expelled, if that can be done without his destruction; but so long as he keeps his place and conducts himself peacefully, he must not be treated in a hostile way. He can not lay claim to be treated thus because of any *right as a guest*, for this would require a special friendly agreement to consider him for a time as a member of some household. His claim is based on a *right of visitation*, common to all men, by virtue of which he may join any society of men, on account of the right of the common possession of the surface of the earth, over which people can not spread abroad indefinitely, but must finally endure living near one another. Originally, however, no one had any more right than another to occupy any particular portion of the earth's surface. The communities of men are separated by uninhabitable portions of this surface, the seas and the deserts, but in such a way that the ship and the camel, "the ship of the desert," make it possible for men to visit one another across these unclaimed regions, and to use the right to the surface, which men possess in common, for the purposes of social intercourse. The inhospitable practice in vogue on some sea coasts, as of the Barbary States, of robbing ships in the neighboring seas, or of making slaves of shipwrecked people, or that of the inhabitants of deserts, such as the Bedouins, of regarding their proximity to nomadic tribes as a right to plunder them, is thus contrary to the right of nature. The right to hospitality which naturally belongs to foreign visitors extends no further than that degree of social intercourse with the old inhabitants determined by the limits of possibility. In this way remote portions of the world may come into friendly relations with one another which at last come to be regulated by public law, and thus bring the human race finally nearer and nearer to a state of world-citizenship.

If the inhospitable behavior of the civilized, commercial states of our portion of the world be compared with this barbarian inhospitality, the injustice which they show when they go to foreign lands and peoples (for they consider their arrival the same as conquest) becomes simply horrible. America, the Negro lands, the Spice Islands, the Cape, etc., were considered by them, when they discovered them, as belonging to nobody. For the inhabitants they counted as nothing. Into East India, under the pretext of simply establishing trading posts, they introduced men of war, and with them oppression of the natives, instigation of the different states of the

country to widespread wars, famine, insurrection, treachery, and so on through the whole category of evils which afflict the human race.

China and Japan, which had had experience with such guests, have done wisely in limiting their intercourse, the former permitting access to her coasts but not entrance into the interior, the latter granting access only to a single European people, the Dutch, whom, however, like prisoners, they shut out from intercourse with the natives. The worst of the matter (or rather, from the standpoint of the moral judge, the best) is, that they get no satisfaction out of this violence, that all these commercial societies are on the point of going to pieces, that the Sugar Islands, the seat of the most shocking and complete slavery, yield no real profit, but only an indirect and at the same time undesirable one, namely, the furnishing of sailors for war-fleets, through whom they assist in carrying on wars in Europe. Thus these powers, which make a great show of piety, drink injustice like water and at the same time wish themselves to be considered as the very elect in the Orthodox faith.

Since the community of the nations of the earth, in a narrower or broader way, has advanced so far that an injustice in one part of the world is felt in all parts, the idea of a cosmopolitical right is no phantastic and strained form of the conception of right, but necessary to complete the unwritten code, not only of the rights of states but of peoples as well, so as to make it coextensive with the rights of men in general, through the establishment of which perpetual peace will come. It is useless to flatter oneself that perpetual peace can be brought nearer and nearer under any other conditions.

CONTINUED NEXT MONTH.

SCHOOL HISTORIES AND INTERNATIONAL ANIMOSITIES.

From the *Outlook*, with permission.

Samuel Plimsoll, M. P. (the originator of the "Plimsoll line," which marks the limit to which vessels may be legally loaded), has been looking into the causes of the "unjust dislike that Americans have for the mother country." "We in England," he says, "have no such feeling toward America. . . . I believe the prejudice starts with children, and is taught to them from school histories, that misstate facts; and in these histories I think the remedy lies."

Mr. Plimsoll, in this belief, has examined the school histories in use in England; and his report, issued by the United States Bureau of Education, is now obtainable. The *New England Magazine* for February last contained the substance of this report, as well as several of Mr. Plimsoll's extracts from the English text-books examined. In thirty-four of these he finds not the slightest unkind allusion to the United States. Of American histories, however, he is reported as saying, "I have been told, and believe, that many of them are unfair, that they foster a wrong feeling toward the mother country."

But Mr. Plimsoll, not relying on such a general preconception, has delayed final decision till he should have examined our books with the same thoroughness as the English. It is with this purpose that he has come to America, and it is interesting to look into the subject for ourselves—to anticipate, if possible, the results of his investigation. Are school histories in this country so un-

fair as he alleges? so liable to rouse in children that "wrong feeling" which undeniably does exist? For every American boy, at some time, from some source, acquires a vigorous hatred for "redcoats" and British—a hatred that later years seldom entirely eradicate. Is the cause of this to be found in the school-books? and, if so, is it an evil inherent in the presentation of the facts, or a mere accident, to be avoided by moderation and discrimination?

Before considering what the text-books really say, we should note that there are, in our relation to England, elements which, to a young and emotional reader, might cause a book really very moderate to inspire patriotism most intolerantly aggressive.

In Mr. Plimsoll's extracts from English books occur the following sentences: "The government sent out soldiers to force the Americans to pay taxes." "The chief causes . . . are to be sought in the high notions of prerogative held by George III., in his infatuated and stubborn self-will, and in the equally absurd self-conceit of his English subjects." "'Taxation without representation is tyranny' became the watchword of the brave patriots who were to fight in America for the self-same rights that Englishmen of old had wrung from the tyrant John, the haughty Edward, and the reluctant Charles I." "The ministers, who had not yet learned wisdom, placed new taxes on tea." It pleases us to read such statements in English books, and undoubtedly the English boy who reads them is impressed with the unpleasant fact that his ancestors were unwise and unjust. But these same statements would rouse in an American boy a keen resentment. They tell of oppression and injustice exercised upon his ancestors by the English. He is the one that is hurt—it is hardest for him to forgive. Human nature, especially juvenile human nature, makes the reader alert in sympathy for the under dog, especially when, as in this case, the under dog is *his* dog. It is, in other words, easier for the English boys to read forgivingly of the resentment and rebellion of the colonists—provoked by English injustice—than it is for American boys to read, without symptoms of sympathetic resentment, of the injustice that provoked it. A sentence that in an English book evinces, by frank confession of an injustice, the best of feeling toward America, might, in an American book, by pointing out that very injustice, inspire hostility to England. The American historian, then, must be fairer to the English than they need to be to themselves. He must allow for the instinctive prejudices of his readers.

The writer of this paper has examined carefully ten histories in common use in American schools. He has read, more or less carefully, many more. He began his examination with the impression that the books were prejudiced and unfair; he ended it feeling that, while prejudice was roused, it was not roused by intentional unfairness or misstatement.

One may, indeed, well dismiss, from the first, the charge of misstatement. Few histories misstate, and those that do are not those most in vogue. True, most err on minor points; few, however, err with the direct end or result of misrepresenting the attitude of England to America. The per cent. of real misstatement is so small as to be ignored.

There is more injustice of omission. The employment of Indians by the British is described, sometimes in very strong terms; but there is little or no mention of the em-